People v. Wilson.
2025 COA 94. No. 22CA1977. Violation of Custody Order or Order Relating to Parental Responsibilities—Unit of Prosecution—Sufficiency of Evidence—Bad Character Evidence—Multiplicity.
December 24, 2025
Hellard, a social caseworker with the Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS), received an emergency custody and pickup order (the order) for Wilson’s four children. Hellard, MCDHS caseworker Sebring, and police officers Dennis and Wright approached Wilson in the driveway of her then boyfriend’s house. Wilson and her child J.W. were standing outside her car and Wilson’s other three children were inside her car. Hellard read the order to Wilson, said that the children were required to come with her, and said that a shelter hearing would take place in two days. Wilson became agitated and got in her car, instructed J.W. to get in the car, and backed out of the driveway. About 30 minutes later, Hellard received a tip from B.P., Wilson’s friend, that Wilson was at her own house. When B.P. arrived at Wilson’s house, she found Wilson in a back bedroom. Wilson was holding her 18-month-old son, C.S., while smoking marijuana. Wilson threatened to kill herself and grabbed a pair of scissors. When Dennis and Wright knocked on the front door, Wilson began stabbing herself in the head with the scissors. Shortly thereafter, J.W. let Dennis and Wright into Wilson’s house, and they entered the back bedroom. Wilson was still sitting on the bed with C.S. in her left arm and a pair of scissors in her right hand. B.P. was lying on the bed, trying to restrain Wilson’s right arm. B.P. told the officers that Wilson had attempted to stab herself. Dennis jumped on the bed to retrieve the scissors. After a struggle, Wilson was arrested. Wilson was convicted of four counts of violation of a custody order, one count of child abuse (no injury, knowing or reckless), one count of child abuse (no injury, negligence), one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing government operations.
On appeal, Wilson argued that there was insufficient evidence to support her violating a child custody order conviction because the prosecution failed to prove that she violated the order, that she intended to deprive a lawful custodian of custody, and that the order was issued by a district or juvenile court. However, the evidence showed that a judge ordered the children to be placed in MCDHS’s temporary custody, and a jury could reasonably conclude that Wilson violated the order by leaving with the children after Hellard explained that it required the children to come with her. There was also sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that Wilson understood the order and acted with the intent to deprive MCDHS of custody. Lastly, the order said “District Court, Mesa County, Colorado,” it had the court’s address, and it was signed “By the Court,” so a rational jury could reasonably infer that the order was issued by a Colorado district court.
Wilson also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support her child abuse conviction because the prosecution did not prove that she let C.S. be unreasonably placed in a life-threatening situation and, to the extent C.S. was in danger, it was because B.P. and the officers confronted her and wrestled with her while she was holding him. But based on B.P.’s testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that Wilson, not B.P. or the police officers, allowed C.S. to be unreasonably placed in a threatening situation.
Wilson further contended that the trial court erroneously admitted extrinsic bad character evidence that her children had previously been placed in foster care. Before trial, Wilson moved in limine to exclude statements or evidence concerning prior MCDHS or child abuse cases. She maintained that her statement about killing herself while stabbing herself in the head was inadmissible because it alluded to a previous instance where she lost her children and could only be used for propensity purposes. The trial court ruled that Wilson’s statement was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and not admissible at trial. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Wilson’s children were previously in foster care, but no evidence was admitted in violation of the trial court’s pretrial ruling. Further, evidence that Wilson had experience with the foster care system was relevant because it rebutted Wilson’s assertion that she did not understand Hellard’s explanation of the order. And because there was no accompanying suggestion of bad character, the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, there was no error.
Wilson also asserted that the unit of prosecution for violating a custody order is per order, not per child, so three of her four convictions under CRS § 18-3-304(2) should be vacated. Based on the statute’s plain language, the court of appeals concluded that the unit of prosecution for violating a child custody order is the number of children affected, not the number of custody orders violated. And Wilson’s conduct constituted factually separate offenses because each charge had a different victim, so vacatur was not required.
Lastly, Wilson contended, and the People agreed, that merging her negligent child abuse conviction into her knowing or reckless child abuse conviction was required. Here, both of Wilson’s child abuse charges were based on Wilson’s stabbing herself in the head while holding C.S. Therefore, the criminal negligence charge was a lesser included offense of the knowing or reckless abuse charge.
The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded with directions for the trial court to merge Wilson’s child abuse convictions and to amend the mittimus accordingly.