People v. Woo.

2025 COA 77. No. 24CA0268. Postconviction Remedies—Return of Seized Property—Final Appealable Order.

September 11, 2025

Police found J.T.’s body in a storage locker that Woo leased. Police arrested Woo and seized property of his, including digital devices that stored large quantities of files, some with images. Woo was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Woo’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Woo later moved for return of his seized property as part of postconviction proceedings. The district court reserved ruling on Woo’s motion pending the outcome of a civil replevin action that Woo had also filed for return of the seized property. The district court dismissed Woo’s replevin action, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff’s Office, 2022 CO 56, ¶ 53, holding that a district court in criminal proceedings retains ancillary jurisdiction to resolve a motion for return of property following a direct appeal, during postconviction proceedings, or after any appeal related to those proceedings. The district court then ordered Woo to advise whether he wanted to pursue his motion for return of property. Woo filed an updated motion, which is at issue here, and requested an evidentiary hearing. The court denied Woo’s hearing request but granted Woo’s motion as to some of the property. The court issued its order without prejudice because Woo had a pending ineffective assistance of counsel motion that could change his circumstances. Woo appealed, and the court of appeals issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final appealable judgment.

On appeal, Woo argued that the district court’s order is a final appealable judgment even though it issued without prejudice. Here, the district court’s order resolved Woo’s motion on the merits as to each item of property, so there was nothing further to decide to completely determine the parties’ rights with respect to the return of Woo’s property. Further, if the court were to deem the order nonfinal because Woo could refile the motion in the future based on changed circumstances, the order might never be final, and Woo would be denied his right to appellate review. And appellate courts in other jurisdictions have reviewed comparable orders addressing motions for the return of property despite ongoing postconviction proceedings. The court thus concluded that the order is final and appealable because it fully addressed Woo’s motion on the merits and ended a discrete proceeding embedded within another.

On the merits, Woo contended that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for return of certain image devices. He maintained that the prosecution didn’t present sufficient evidence that the image devices in fact contain images of J.T. It is undisputed that Woo owns the property at issue and that it was seized by law enforcement. The district court denied the return of the devices based solely on the prosecution’s statements that the image devices contain J.T.’s images, and it’s not clear that the prosecution even alleged that some devices contain J.T.’s images. The prosecution thus failed to meet its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence why Woo isn’t entitled to the return of these items, and the district court abused its discretion by denying the return of the image devices.

Woo further asserted that the court abused its discretion by denying the return of all other property because the prosecution didn’t present sufficient evidence that the items may be needed if a retrial occurs. However, it is uncertain what evidence may be necessary in the event of a retrial, so the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying the return of property on this basis.

Woo also argued that the court abused its discretion by denying return of drive 66-RSH. The prosecution objected to releasing drive 66-RSH on the basis that the drive couldn’t be opened at the time, that its contents might be accessible in the future, and that data on the drive might be needed for a retrial. However, the prosecution didn’t explain why it couldn’t open drive 66-RSH and did not present evidence that it had tried and failed to open the drive or suggest what data stored on 66-RSH might be needed for a retrial. And Woo asserted that the prosecution had opened the drive before his trial and concluded that it didn’t contain any relevant information and that all data on this drive predates his first encounter with J.T. The district court thus erred by relying solely on the prosecution’s unsworn representations to support its finding that drive 66-RSH couldn’t be accessed before Woo’s first trial and may be able to be accessed at a future time.

Woo additionally contended that the denial of his motion for return of property permanently deprives him of the property such that it is a forfeiture in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As to property that the prosecution established it may need at a retrial, the district court’s order doesn’t permanently deprive Woo of his property because Woo can refile his motion after the ineffective assistance proceedings conclude, any possible retrial, or any proceedings following the retrial. Therefore, the partial denial of his motion is not a “forfeiture.”

Woo also argued that some of the property at issue was seized illegally. But this claim is outside the scope of Woo’s motion for return of property, and the court didn’t err by not ordering the return of property on this basis.

Lastly, Woo asserted that the court erred by concluding that CRS § 18-1-1103(2), which concerns a law enforcement agency’s duty to preserve DNA evidence obtained when conducting a criminal investigation that results in a conviction for a class 1 felony, applies to his property. Assuming without deciding that the court erred, any error was harmless because the court concluded that Woo waived his right to have the DNA evidence preserved and thus didn’t deny the return of property on this basis.

The denial of the return of property as to the image devices and drive 66-RSH was reversed. The other portions of the district court’s order were affirmed. The case was remanded for further proceedings.