Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc.
2026 COA 46. No. 25CA0491. Reno v. Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. Health Care Availability Act—Arbitration Agreements—Principal-Agent Relationship—Medical Durable Power of Attorney—Actual Authority—Apparent Authority.
June 4, 2026
In 2014, Henderson signed a medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA) that appointed her daughter Wills as her attorney-in-fact. The MDPOA specifically prohibited Wills from acting for Henderson for any purpose unrelated to her health care. A decade later, Henderson was admitted to Continuum at Sharmar, Inc. d/b/a Sharmar Village Care Center, Inc. (Sharmar), a nursing home in Pueblo. Henderson, Wills, and a Sharmar representative met to sign the admission paperwork. Henderson left during the meeting to attend another appointment, and Wills completed the paperwork alone, including signing an arbitration agreement. About a month after Henderson was admitted to Sharmar, she fell twice in roughly 48 hours, and she died three days after her first fall. Reno, another of Henderson’s daughters and the personal representative of Henderson’s estate, sued Sharmar and its administrator for negligence, violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, and wrongful death. Sharmar moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings based on the arbitration agreement signed by Wills. Reno opposed the motion, arguing the agreement was invalid because Wills had no authority to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf of Henderson. The parties conducted limited discovery on the scope of Wills’s authority and the circumstances under which the arbitration agreement was signed. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that the MDPOA did not give Wills authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Henderson’s behalf and that Wills did not have actual or apparent authority to do so based on her words or actions. The court denied Sharmar’s motion to compel arbitration.
On appeal, Sharmar argued that the district court erred by determining as a matter of law that the MDPOA did not authorize Wills to enter into the arbitration agreement. An MDPOA grants an agent powers to consent to or refuse medical treatment, as defined therein, on behalf of a principal. The court of appeals held that an MDPOA does not grant an agent authority to enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf of her principal unless the MDPOA expressly grants that authority. Here, the MDPOA did not give Wills authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Henderson’s behalf.
Sharmar also contended that the district court erred by ruling that Wills lacked actual authority to enter into an arbitration agreement with Sharmar. Actual authority includes both express and implied authority. Here, there is no evidence that Henderson granted express authority to Wills to execute the arbitration agreement. And Sharmar proffered no evidence that there were discussions between Henderson and Wills concerning an arbitration agreement nor any admissible evidence that Henderson orally authorized Wills to enter into an arbitration agreement. Therefore, the district court properly decided that Wills lacked actual authority to execute the arbitration agreement.
Sharmar further asserted that Wills had apparent authority to agree to arbitration because Henderson left Wills to finish signing admissions paperwork, which gave rise to Sharmar’s reasonable belief that Henderson authorized Wills to execute paperwork on her behalf. The court rejected this argument for the same reasons it rejected the claim of actual authority.
Sharmar additionally asserted that notwithstanding the district court’s rulings on actual or apparent authority, an evidentiary hearing was required because the district court relied on cases involving arbitration agreements executed as part of a nursing home’s admission paperwork, and the act of Henderson leaving Wills to sign admissions paperwork could have supported a different interpretation of Wills’s authority. However, Sharmar proffered no evidence that would support a finding of either express or implied authority at any time before entry of the district court’s order denying arbitration, and the appellate record is devoid of any such proffer. Because Sharmar had the burden to establish that Wills had authority to execute the arbitration agreement and failed to do so, the district had no obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing.
The order denying Sharmar’s motion to compel arbitration was affirmed.