Schnelle v. Cantafio.
2024 COA 17. No. 23CA1333. Summary Judgment—Motion for Directed Verdict—Malicious Prosecution—Lack of Probable Cause—CRCP 50—CRCP 56—C.A.R.4.2(d).
February 15, 2024
In a previous case, Scott sued Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging that Schnelle mishandled her responsibilities as the listing broker for the sale of Scott’s commercial property, causing the property to be sold for less than its fair market value. In that case, Schnelle moved for summary judgment on the ground that Scott couldn’t establish the necessary elements of breach of the professional duty of care, damages, or causation to support her claim. The trial court denied the motion, the case proceeded to a jury trial, and at the close of Scott’s case, Schnelle made an oral motion for a directed verdict, which the court denied. The jury returned a verdict for Schnelle. Schnelle then brought this case against Scott and Scott’s attorneys in the previous case, their law firm, and other members of the law firm (defendants), initially asserting claims for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional interference with economic advantage, and outrageous conduct. In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, Schnelle voluntarily dismissed the intentional interference with economic advantage claim, and the trial court dismissed the civil conspiracy and outrageous conduct claims. The court denied defendants’ motion as it related to the malicious prosecution claim, rejecting defendants’ argument that the denial of Schnelle’s motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict in the previous case prevented her from establishing the probable cause element of her malicious prosecution claim in this case.
Defendants petitioned the court of appeals to allow their interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.2(d). The court granted the petition, agreeing with the trial court’s certification that (1) immediate review of the question presented—whether the denial of a motion for summary judgment or a directed verdict establishes probable cause for bringing a claim as a matter of law—may promote more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; (2) the order involves a controlling question of law concerning the effect of rulings under CRCP 56 and 50; and (3) that question of law is unresolved in Colorado.
On the merits, the court noted that Rule 56 requires a court to grant summary judgment if a properly filed motion satisfies its standards. However, Rule 50 doesn’t include the type of mandatory language that appears in Rule 56, and the Colorado Supreme Court has established stringent standards for granting directed verdict motions in only the clearest of cases. The court considered that cases from other jurisdictions generally take two approaches on the question of how the denial of a defense summary judgment or directed verdict motion affects a later determination of probable cause for a malicious prosecution or similar claim. In one approach, several courts have held that the denial of such a motion creates a presumption of probable cause to support a claim. On the other hand, several courts have considered the denial of summary judgment or a directed verdict not as presumptive proof but as a factor to consider in determining whether there was probable cause to support a claim. The court held that the denial of summary judgment or a directed verdict does not establish a presumption of probable cause but is merely a factor that may be considered in determining whether there was probable cause to bring the claims in the previous case. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Schnelle’s motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict in the previous case do not necessarily preclude her malicious prosecution claim in this case, though they are matters that may properly be considered in the determination of probable cause.
The order was affirmed to the extent that it denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim and the case was remanded for further proceedings.