Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees.
No. 25-8039. 5/4/2026. D.Wyo. Judge Tymkovich. COVID-19 Mask Mandate for Students—Noncompliance With Mandate—First Amendment—Fourteenth Amendment—Retaliation.
May 4, 2026
Grace Smith was a student at Laramie High School when the Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees (board) instituted a COVID-19 indoor mask mandate for kindergarten through 12th grade. On September 9, the first day of the mandate’s implementation, Grace and other students refused to wear masks and were forced to leave school. The next day, Grace led about 80 students in a walkout to protest the mandate. Grace was subsequently suspended several times for not complying with the mandate and was eventually arrested when she would not leave school grounds. On October 13, Grace withdrew from school. Grace and her parents sued the board, the district superintendent, and the Laramie High School principal (collectively, the district) under 42 USC § 1983 and Wyoming law for allegedly infringing on their federal and state rights. The federal claims alleged that the district violated the First Amendment by compelling speech and retaliating against Grace for her protected opposition to compelled speech, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee by depriving her of her protected property interest in a public education. The state law claims alleged that the board interfered with the Smiths’ fundamental right to care for their child in violation of the Wyoming Constitution and state statutes, that the board acted ultra vires by enacting a public health policy without authority, and that the Wyoming legislature exceeded its state constitutional powers by enacting a statute modifying public health authorities. The district court held that the Smiths had not alleged an injury-in-fact and therefore lacked standing, so it dismissed the federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Smiths had alleged an injury-in-fact because they alleged Grace was repeatedly punished for opposing the mandate, had been suspended three times, and was cited for trespassing and arrested when she refused to leave campus. On remand, the district court granted the district’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on each of the federal causes of action, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the Smiths argued that mask-wearing is a form of speech that cannot be compelled and the district court erred by holding otherwise. The Smiths maintained that the district lacked authority to promulgate a public health order, so the mask mandate had no legitimate purpose but instead was imposed to “endorse a favored message.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations that, taken as true, state a plausible claim for relief. The First Amendment protects individuals against speech compelled by governmental action. Here, the Smiths did not identify any message compelled by the mask mandate. By failing to establish “speech,” their compelled speech claim fails.
The Smiths also contended that the district unlawfully retaliated against Grace for exercising her First Amendment right to speak on a matter of public concern. They maintained that Grace engaged in constitutionally protected activity by organizing and leading the walkout, talking to district officials about her opposition to the mandate, and engaging in symbolic speech by refusing to comply with the mask mandate. They also alleged that the district’s decision to suspend Grace three times and to have her fined and arrested for trespassing chilled speech. The district did not contest the district court’s determination that Grace’s participation in the walkout and related demonstrations was protected activity, and conceded that the Smiths adequately pled the chilling prong of a retaliation claim. The Tenth Circuit thus examined only the district’s motivation. Here, a plain reading of the complaint conveyed that the district punished Grace for refusing to wear a mask on campus. The complaint did not indicate that the district’s actions were motivated by Grace’s role in the walkout. Further, the Smiths claim that the temporal proximity between Grace’s suspension and the walkout supported an inference of retaliation, without more, failed the necessary showing for retaliatory motive. The Smiths thus failed to allege that participation in the walkout was the but-for cause of Grace’s suspensions, so their claim that the district retaliated against her for that protected activity failed. And Grace’s noncompliance with the mask mandate did not constitute protected expressive conduct for First Amendment purposes because the Smiths’ complaint did not plausibly allege a great likelihood that observers would understand Grace’s message, given other more plausible explanations for a person’s decision to defy a mask mandate, for example, health reasons. Because Grace’s conduct was not protected by the First Amendment, it could not serve as the basis for a retaliation claim.
The Smiths further asserted that the district deprived Grace of Fourteenth Amendment due process protection by promulgating and enforcing the mask mandate. The complaint alleged a deprivation of procedural due process, but the Smiths argued in district court that the mask mandate implicated substantive due process, so the Tenth Circuit considered both claims, as did the district court. First, the district provided Grace notice and an opportunity to be heard before her suspensions, which is all the Fourteenth Amendment requires, so there was no procedural due process violation. Second, the Smiths did not sufficiently allege an unlawful infringement of a protected right or a government action so arbitrary that it shocked the conscience. Thus, their substantive due process claim also failed.
Because the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all the federal claims, it determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the supplemental state law claims.
The judgment was affirmed.