Tennyson v. People.

2025 CO 31. No. 23SC168. Restitution—CRS § 18-1.3-603—Postconviction Proceedings—Illegal Manner—Illegal Sentence—Crim. P. 35(a)—Crim. P. 32—People v. Weeks—Sanoff v. People—People v. Baker—Meza v. People.

May 27, 2025

The supreme court concluded that a post-sentencing order issued pursuant to CRS § 18-1.3-603(1)(b), setting the amount of restitution owed, is not part of the sentence or of the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, the court concluded that a Crim. P. 35(a) claim challenging the timeliness of such an order is an illegal manner claim subject to the time limitation in Crim. P. 35(b), not an illegal sentence claim that may be brought at any time.
At sentencing in this case, the district court entered a subsection (1)(b) order finding restitution liability and deferring the determination of the amount of restitution until after sentencing. But the district court thereafter failed to determine the amount of restitution before the subsection (1)(b) deadline expired. Some years later, Tennyson brought a Crim. P. 35(a) claim challenging the timeliness of the post-sentencing restitution order. The supreme court concluded that because Tennyson failed to bring his Crim. P. 35(a) claim within the time limitation in Crim. P. 35(b), the claim was time-barred. And because a division of the court of appeals reached the same result using the same rationale, its judgment is affirmed.