Trudgian v. LM General Insurance Co.
2024 COA 87. No. 23CA1141. Motor Vehicle Insurance Policies—Total Loss Coverage—Remedies—Implied Private Right of Action—Declaratory Judgment.
August 8, 2024
Trudgian owned a motor vehicle that was insured by LM General Insurance Company (LM). The insurance policy included coverage for the vehicle’s total loss. Trudgian renewed her vehicle registration in June 2017 for the next year, but in September 2017 the vehicle was involved in an accident and LM determined that the vehicle was a total loss. LM did not reimburse Trudgian for the amount of registration fees she had paid that were applicable to the time period after the car was totaled. Trudgian subsequently brought this class action lawsuit against LM asserting (1) a statutorily authorized claim under CRS § 10-3-1116(1), (2) breach of contract, (3) bad faith breach of contract, and (4) a declaratory judgment claim. LM moved for summary judgment on the ground that that all claims were barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction because Trudgian accepted a payment from LM that purportedly satisfied its total obligations to her, including those under § 10-4-639(1). The district court denied this motion. LM then moved for summary judgment on the ground that § 10-4-639(1) could not be enforced through a private civil action. The district court granted the motion.
On appeal, Trudgian argued that § 10-4-639(1) can be enforced through a private civil action. CRS § 10-4-639(1), the total loss statute, imposes an affirmative duty on motor vehicle insurers to pay the insured the title and registration fees associated with the total loss of the insured’s motor vehicle, but it does not expressly provide for a private civil remedy. Rather, § 10 4-601.5 provides that the Colorado Insurance Commissioner must administer and enforce Part 6, but it does not give the commissioner the exclusive authority to do so. The court of appeals thus applied the test in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905 (Colo. 1992), to determine whether a private right of action is implied, considering (1) whether plaintiff is within the class of people the statute was intended to benefit; (2) whether the legislature intended to imply a private right of action; and (3) whether a private right of action was consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme. As to the first factor, it is undisputed that Trudgian and the class members are within the group of people that § 10-4-639(1) is meant to benefit. The second factor does not favor finding an implied private right of action because the statute does not clearly express a legislative intent to imply such right of action in § 10-4-639(1). Lastly, an implied private right of action would be redundant of a statutory action under § 10-3-1116(1). Accordingly, the court concluded that there is no implied private right of action to enforce § 10-4-639(1).
Further, the only claim that directly relied on the implied private right of action for its validity was the declaratory judgment claim. Trudgian raised no challenge on appeal to the dismissal of the § 10-3-1116(1) claim. And no nonconclusory argument in Trudgian’s opening brief explains why the court erred by dismissing the breach of contract and bad faith breach of contract claims. The court thus concluded that no challenge to the dismissal of those claims was properly before it, and it expressed no opinion about any such challenge.
The court also dismissed LM’s cross-appeal, in which it argued that the district court erred by denying its first motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, for lack of jurisdiction because (1) it is moot and (2) a summary judgment denial is not a final order.
The judgment was affirmed, and LM’s cross-appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.