United States v. Beckner.
No. 24-2109. 2/17/2026. D.N.M. Judge Hartz. Bank Fraud—Wire Fraud—Conspiracy to Commit Mail, Bank, and Wire Fraud— Fed. R. Evid. 403—Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)—US Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(a)—US Sentencing Guideline § 2B1.1(b)(10)—Sentence Disparity.
February 17, 2026
Beckner lived in Honduras with his wife and children. In 2006, he moved to Deming, New Mexico, to take over the operation of a truck stop, assuming the alias “Bill Evans.” Beckner then used his alias and a number of companies to fraudulently obtain loans and investments, ostensibly to finance the truck stop. Curtis, Herlihy, and Romero participated in the scheme. Curtis, the 19-year-old son of Beckner’s deceased friend, moved to Deming with Buckner. Curtis was the initial “operating manager” of the truck stop, and Herlihy assumed Curtis’s title about a year later. Romero, Beckner’s girlfriend and the mother of his children, was a Honduran native and citizen who served as a conduit of money from the truck stop. Curtis married Romero at Beckner’s request so she could obtain a US visa. Beckner structured the truck stop to make it harder to determine his degree of influence in the enterprise, with the foregoing individuals participating in the truck stop through a number of domestic and foreign corporations. Beckner was tried and convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail, bank, and wire fraud. The district court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Beckner argued that the evidence that he connived to circumvent immigration restrictions by arranging a sham marriage between Romero and Curtis was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because the risk of improper prejudice was outweighed by its probative value. However, whether Beckner controlled Curtis was central to the trial, and this evidence showed Beckner’s control over Curtis and supported Beckner’s responsibility for the fraud scheme as a whole. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice.
Beckner further contended that the marriage evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, which established nothing more than his propensity to commit crime. However, the district court properly found that the rule’s requirements were met, and it gave a limiting instruction directing the jury to not make a propensity inference.
Beckner additionally challenged the admission of evidence of his ties to Central America. Here, the court properly admitted evidence of Beckner’s ties and travel to Central American countries as evidence of his hidden financial interest in the truck stop and his consciousness of guilt. Evidence of Beckner’s use of offshore accounts and companies let the jury infer that he was sheltering the assets he derived from the fraudulent transactions from American creditors. And his relocation to Honduras after receiving a cease-and-desist order gave rise to a reasonable inference of flight. Further, Beckner was allowed to present evidence of his innocent reasons for traveling and remaining abroad and sending money there, and he was allowed to rebut the government’s characterization of his flight by pointing out the two-month gap between his receipt of the cease-and-desist letter and his relocation to Honduras. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion by letting the jury decide what Beckner’s motives were.
Beckner also challenged the admission of evidence that Romero had received a large sum of money out of a $5.1 million loan to Curtis in a buyout scheme. He argued that evidence of the buyout was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because it was offered to show a propensity to commit crime and should have otherwise been excluded under Rule 403. Here, the government told the jury in its opening statement that directing the proceeds from the buyout to an account under Beckner and Romero’s control was not part of the charged conduct and that the government was not saying it was illegal for Beckner and Romero to have that account or to move money into the account as a result of the sale of a business that they owned. The buyout evidence was admitted for the proper purpose of showing Beckner’s control over the scheme, and it was relevant and probative for that purpose. Further, the district court could properly decide that the uncontested evidence of Beckner’s false inducements to investors and concealment of his identity and debts from lenders and investors outweighed any potential unfair prejudice. The court thus did not err in admitting evidence that loan proceeds were distributed to an offshore company beneficially owned by Romero.
Beckner further disputed the four-level enhancement to his guideline offense level under US Sentencing Guideline (USSG) § 3B1.1(a), which allows that enhancement for a defendant who was a “[1] leader of a criminal activity that [2] involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” Here, the evidence supports a finding that Beckner exercised ultimate decision-making authority by, for example, controlling the flow of money that was ostensibly managed by Curtis and Herlihy, and recruiting accomplices and controlling others contributing to the scheme. Accordingly, Beckner’s guideline offense level correctly reflected that he was a “leader” of “extensive” criminal activity under USSG § 3B1.1(a). And while Beckner received a much greater sentence than his codefendant, this disparity was warranted because Beckner was more culpable in the scheme, and his sentence was aggravated by factors not shared by the codefendant.
Beckner additionally challenged the two-level enhancement of his guideline offense level under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10), which was applied because his offense “involved sophisticated means” and he “intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” Beckner maintained that the enhancement was improper because he did not offshore funds from loans and investors but used them domestically to improve and operate the truck stop, that he drew a salary that was not extravagant, and that the enterprise collapsed financially because of unsophisticated management. Here, however, Beckner used Panamanian shell corporations, with Romero as their straw owner, to stash the scheme’s proceeds and conceal any direct connection to himself, when running the illegitimate part of the enterprise. And Beckner used offshore bank accounts for the same purpose. The district court thus could properly apply the enhancement.
Lastly, Beckner asserted that the disparity between his 210-month prison sentence, which is at the bottom of his advisory guideline imprisonment range of 210 to 262 months, and Herlihy’s single day of imprisonment renders Beckner’s sentence substantively unreasonable. But Beckner and Herlihy are not similarly situated defendants, so disparity is not an issue.
The judgment was affirmed.