United States v. Chavarria.
No. 23-2102. 6/16/2025. D.N.M. Judge Tymkovich. Federal Kidnapping Statute—Motor Vehicle—“Instrumentality of Interstate Commerce”—Federal Jurisdiction.
June 16, 2025
Chavarria and Romero allegedly kidnapped and brutally murdered a woman in New Mexico. They were charged with the federal crime of kidnapping resulting in death under 18 USC § 1201(a). The superseding indictment alleged that in committing the offense, Chavarria and Romero “used a motor vehicle, a means, facility, and instrumentality of interstate commerce.” Chavarria and Romero moved to dismiss the superseding indictment. The district court made a legal determination that a “motor vehicle” is not per se an “instrumentality of interstate commerce” under the federal kidnapping statute, and it dismissed the case.
On appeal, the government argued that the district court erred in its legal determination, maintaining that motor vehicles are instrumentalities of interstate commerce and that the entire universe of motor vehicles is subject to federal regulation. Kidnapping is normally a state crime but becomes a federal crime under 18 USC § 1201(a) if the offender uses an “instrumentality of interstate commerce in committing or in furtherance of the offense.” For federal jurisdiction to attach, the federal crime must relate the prohibited activity to one of the government’s enumerated and limited powers, such as, as relevant here, its power over interstate commerce. Accordingly, the instrumentality—here, an ordinary Jeep used to commit an intrastate crime—must have somehow affected interstate commerce for its use to fall under the federal kidnapping statute. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that not every motor vehicle is essential to, or predominantly used for, commerce, and many vehicles (e.g., e-bikes, electric scooters, and motorized wheelchairs) have no cognizable relationship to commerce. The Tenth Circuit thus held that “motor vehicles,” as an undefined, generic term, are not per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce for purposes of the federal kidnapping statute. Thus, lacking any details about how this kidnapping affected interstate commerce at all, the government’s indictment is fatally deficient, and the district court properly dismissed it.
The dismissal of the superseding indictment was affirmed.