United States v. Coulter.
No. 24-6026. 4/15/2025. W.D.Okla. Judge Tymkovich. Restitution—But-for Cause of Victim’s Injuries—Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act—Expert Opinion.
April 15, 2025
Coulter was found guilty of conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking of Doe 1 and Doe 2 and child sex trafficking with respect to Doe 1. The government moved for restitution of $1,145,900 for Doe 1 and $967,000 for Doe 2 under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The government also requested that Coulter and co-defendant Andrade pay a $5,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA) for each count of conviction. The government’s motion relied on the expert reports and opinions of psychologist Dr. Missar, who opined that Doe 1 suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), severe depression, and dysthymia from the trauma of being sexually trafficked; and that Doe 2 suffers from PTSD, dysthymia, and mood disorders due to the trauma of being sexually trafficked. Based on his assessment, Dr. Missar recommended various types of treatment for Doe 1 and Doe 2. The district court considered Dr. Missar’s evaluation; related evidence and testimony from the trial and the restitution hearing; and the record as a whole. It awarded restitution for 10 years of therapy, psychiatric treatment, and medication in the amount of $198,000 for Doe 1 and $188,000 for Doe 2. The district court determined that a hybrid joint-and-several restitution approach was appropriate and thus apportioned the restitution between Coulter and Andrade based on their respective contributions to the victims’ injuries. The district court also imposed a $5,000 per-count special assessment on Coulter and Andrade pursuant to the JVTA.
On appeal, Coulter argued that the district court erred by finding that the government met its burden of showing that he was a but-for cause of the victims’ injuries. He asserted that Dr. Missar knew but didn’t account for effects from the victims’ previous sources of trauma that occurred before Coulter’s actions. For example, Doe 1 likely experienced trauma from being molested by a family member when she was 7 years old and from having friends that committed suicide; and Doe 2 likely experienced trauma from her mother’s death and an unstable home situation. The government must show that the defendant’s conduct was the but-for and proximate cause of the victims’ losses for which restitution is sought, and a defendant cannot avoid liability by citing another factor that contributed to the harm. Accordingly, the degree to which prior abuse contributed to the victims’ current medical status is irrelevant to what the government must prove for restitution purposes. Here, Dr. Missar opined that his knowledge of the victims’ prior traumatic events did not change his analysis because there was a nexus between the victims’ trafficking experiences and their symptoms that requires treatment. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Coulter was the but-for cause of the victims’ injuries for restitution purposes.
Coulter also contended that even if but-for causation was proved, there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s award of 10 years of restitution for ongoing individual therapy, psychiatric treatment, and medication, particularly since Dr. Missar recommended a lifetime of treatment for those categories. But an expert’s testimony and reports are only some record evidence that a district court should consider. Here, the district court carefully calculated amounts that were less than 20% of the government’s restitution request, which greatly benefited Coulter; and the government failed to show that Coulter’s conduct warranted a lifetime of compensation for related therapy and medication. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the three categories of restitution to 10 years as opposed to Doe 1 and Doe 2’s lifetime.
The restitution award was affirmed.