United States v. Crosby.
Nos. 23-2155 & 23-2156. 10/23/2024. D.N.M. Judge McHugh. US Sentencing Guidelines—18 USC § 3553 Factors—Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence.
October 23, 2024
Crosby served in the US Air Force at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico. He was indicted in the District of New Mexico on one charge of possession of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and subsequently was administratively separated from the Air Force. Shortly thereafter, he returned to his hometown in Pennsylvania, where he was later arrested pursuant to a New Mexico arrest warrant. The FBI then executed a search warrant on his home, which led to a second arrest and Crosby’s indictment in Pennsylvania on one count of possession of visual depictions of prepubescent minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Following this arrest, Crosby was held in custody for five days before being released on pretrial conditions. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 20, jurisdiction over this case was transferred to the District of New Mexico, and the proceedings in the two cases were consolidated. Crosby pleaded guilty to both charges. Ultimately, the district court sentenced him to “five days or time served, whichever is less,” and a 15-year supervised release term. In addition to the mandatory and standard supervised release conditions, the district court imposed an extensive list of special conditions and ordered Crosby to pay each of the six identifiable victims $2,000 in restitution. Neither party objected to the sentence at that time.
On appeal, the Government challenged the substantive reasonableness of Crosby’s sentence arguing, as relevant here, that the sentence imposed does not (1) account for retribution or general deterrence under 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (B); (2) reflect the sentencing range established under § 3553(a)(4); or (3) avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6). Section 3553(a) requires district courts to consider seven factors in sentencing, including the aforementioned three. The Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1090 (10th Cir. 2019), that if the district court placed “nearly exclusive focus” on one § 3553(a) factor without explaining the weight afforded to other factors, the appellate court cannot defer to its determination that the sentence was supported by all § 3553(a) factors, and the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Applying Cookson, the Tenth Circuit found, first, that the district court did not mention the needs to promote respect for the law or for just punishment, so it did not provide any reasoning concerning retribution. Second, the district court did not indicate that it considered the general deterrence factor. Third, the district court failed to discuss whether Crosby’s sentence avoids unwarranted sentencing disparities. And fourth, the district court did not justify why a sentence below the lowest possible US Sentencing Guidelines range was appropriate in this case. Therefore, Crosby’s sentence is substantively unreasonable.
The district court’s decision sentencing Crosby to five days’ time-served was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing.