United States v. Eckstein.
No. 24-3138. 1/9/2026. D.Kan. Judge Bacharach. Plea Negotiations—Court Participation—Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1).
January 9, 2026
Eckstein was charged with 14 counts that could have resulted in life imprisonment and forfeiture of assets. In a signed plea agreement, the government agreed to drop 13 of the counts, and Eckstein agreed to plead guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine. The district court scheduled a change-of-plea hearing, expecting that Eckstein would plead guilty per the agreement. But at the change-of-plea hearing, Eckstein said that he needed more information before he could decide whether to plead guilty. Defense counsel expressed frustration and requested leave to withdraw, and the district court conducted an ex parte discussion with Eckstein and his attorney during which counsel said that his relationship with his client had broken down. However, later in the discussion Eckstein said he would plead guilty and carry out the agreement.
On appeal, Eckstein argued that the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) by participating in plea negotiations, based on the ex parte discussion. Rule 11(c)(1) prohibits a district court from participating in plea discussions regardless of whether such participation is explicit or implicit. The participation is explicit when a district court directly involves itself in the negotiations, but the rule doesn’t bar a court from every comment about a plea. Whether a court’s participation in plea negotiations was improper depends on the specific facts and circumstances considered in the context of the full record. Here, to make an informed decision about counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Eckstein and his counsel for their perspectives. Eckstein said he needed more information before he could decide whether to plead guilty. The court explained to Eckstein that if counsel was allowed to withdraw, Eckstein would likely spend time hiring a new attorney, who would then need time to assess the matter and advise Eckstein. In the meantime, the government could revoke the plea offer at any time before the district court accepted it. The court also told Eckstein twice that the court didn’t know whether the plea offer was good or bad, and there was no pressure on him to accept the plea offer. With these assurances, the court offered Eckstein the options to (1) proceed that day with the change of plea, (2) start the process of getting a new attorney, or (3) delay the proceedings for two days so Eckstein could think about it and consult with others before deciding what to do. Eckstein maintained that this explanation constituted the district court’s participation in plea negotiations by pressing for an immediate plea decision. However, there were no ongoing negotiations, as Eckstein had already accepted the plea offer, and the court gave Eckstein options in addition to entering a plea that day. The only immediate question was whether to let counsel withdraw, which could trigger a delay without any assurance about when Eckstein would pick a new attorney or decide on the plea. Under these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the court didn’t participate in plea negotiations.
Eckstein also argued that the court prejudiced him after he decided to accept the plea agreement by not informing him that he had a right to appointed counsel. Under Rule 11(b)(1)(D), when a court takes a plea, it must inform the defendant of specific rights, including the right to counsel and appointment of counsel if the defendant cannot afford an attorney. Here, the court told Eckstein that he had the right to counsel but didn’t say that this right included appointment of counsel upon a showing of financial need. Eckstein didn’t object, and the parties agreed that the plain error standard applied. In this case, prejudice turned on the possibility that Eckstein would have pleaded not guilty if the court had explained the right to appointed counsel when taking the plea. This possibility was unlikely because (1) Eckstein had already confirmed that he would carry out the plea agreement, (2) he had been told three times during the proceedings that he had the right to an attorney, and (3) he had earlier acknowledged at his initial appearance that he understood his right to appointment of counsel if he couldn’t afford to hire an attorney. Eckstein thus failed to show an effect on his substantial rights from the district court’s failure to remind him about his right to appointed counsel.
The conviction was affirmed.