United States v. Garcia-Limon.
No. 23-7055. 7/22/2025. E.D.Okla. Judge Eid. Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Minor in Indian Country—Abusive Sexual Contact in Indian Country—Constitutional Sufficiency of Charging Document—Duplicitous Counts—Constructive Amendment of Indictment.
July 22, 2025
A grand jury indicted Garcia-Limon on four charges in connection with the sexual abuse of his daughter D.C. As relevant here, he was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country, in violation of 18 USC §§ 2241(c), 2246(2)(D), 1151, and 1152; and abusive sexual contact in Indian Country, in violation of 18 USC §§ 2244(a)(5), 2246(3), 1151, and 1152 (counts 2 and 3). Rather than being charged with a single incident of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact, Garcia-Limon was charged with engaging in largely the same “sexual act” and the same “sexual contact” with D.C. on numerous occasions over an eight-year period. Garcia-Limon moved to dismiss counts 2 and 3, arguing that the eight-year date range in each count was not specific enough to give him fair notice of the charged offenses and that counts 2 and 3 charged a single act rather than a scheme or series of sexual acts. The district court denied the motion, and Garcia-Limon was convicted of the charges.
On appeal, Garcia-Limon argued that counts 2 and 3 are constitutionally defective because they did not sufficiently advise him of the nature of the accusations against him. An indictment must set forth the elements of the offense charged, give the defendant fair notice of the charges against them, and allow the defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense. Here, each count meets these requirements, so the indictment was constitutionally sufficient.
Garcia-Limon also contended that neither 18 USC § 2241(c) nor § 2244(a)(5) authorizes a conviction for a scheme or series of multiple acts of sexual abuse, and the district court’s contrary ruling made counts 2 and 3 duplicitous. He maintained that because the government presented evidence of multiple incidents of sexual abuse at trial, the jury was not required to agree about which incidents supported its unanimous verdict. A duplicitous indictment charges two or more separate offenses in the same count. The Tenth Circuit determined that the plain language of §§ 2241(c) and 2244(a)(5) authorizes charging a scheme or series of very similar sexual acts in a single count. Further, count 2 alleged that Garcia-Limon repeatedly engaged in “a sexual act” during an eight-year period, while count 3 alleged that he repeatedly engaged in “sexual contact” during the same period. Accordingly, the indictment was not facially duplicitous. Additionally, the district court gave a unanimity instruction, and nothing in the record suggests the jury verdict was not unanimous. Therefore, the indictment was not unconstitutionally duplicitous.
Garcia-Limon further asserted that the district court constructively amended the indictment at trial because counts 2 and 3 each charge only a single instance of sexual abuse and sexual contact but the government introduced evidence of multiple incidents of abuse. However, the record shows that the bases for conviction presented at trial match those in the charging document. Accordingly, the indictment was not constructively amended.
The convictions were affirmed.