United States v. Goldesberry.
No. 23-5008. 2/19/2025. N.D.Okla. Judge Rossman. Sexual Abuse in Indian Country—Sufficiency of Evidence—Equipoise Principle.
February 19, 2025
K.G., who was then 11 years old, had a nightmare and then got into her parents’ bed. That night only her father Goldesberry was in the bed, and K.G. thought he was asleep because he was snoring. K.G. woke up during the night when she felt Goldesberry’s hand under her underwear. K.G. woke Goldesberry up as soon as she felt his hand, and he apologized to her, stating that he thought she was her mother. K.G. did not initially tell anyone about what happened, but several years later, she disclosed the incident to her friend, and a child protective services investigation ensued. Goldesberry was subsequently charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian Country. He never denied a sexual act occurred but maintained that the incident was an accident. At the close of the government’s case, Goldesberry moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly committed the sexual act. The district court reserved ruling on the motion, and the trial resumed. Before the defense rested, Goldesberry renewed his Rule 29 motion, and the district court again reserved ruling. A jury found Goldesberry guilty as charged. The district court then denied Goldesberry’s Rule 29 motion. Goldesberry was sentenced 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Goldesberry argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. He maintained that the evidence at most “gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence,” so under the equipoise principle, his conviction must be reversed. The Tenth Circuit employs the equipoise principle when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence. Under this principle, if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, equally or nearly equally supports a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily have a reasonable doubt. Here, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor, the record establishes that Goldesberry committed a sexual act by touching K.G. But as to the mens rea element, the evidence shows that on the night in question, Mrs. Goldesberry had gone to sleep with Mr. Goldesberry but was called into work at the hospital sometime in the middle of the night. Mr. and Mrs. Goldesberry’s bedroom was completely dark, and Goldesberry is a heavy sleeper who suffers from sleep apnea. K.G., who occasionally entered her parents’ bed when she had a nightmare, then crawled into bed next to her father and assumed he was asleep because he was snoring. K.G. fell asleep too. K.G. testified that at the time of the incident, she and her mother were physically similar in height, build, and hair; and K.G. had developed pubic hair. This evidence cannot support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that Goldesberry was aware of his daughter’s presence in bed. Further, the evidence shows that Goldesberry expressed no indication of awareness when he touched K.G.; he immediately stopped touching her when she woke him; he exhibited profuse remorse; and he explained why he might have subconsciously touched K.G. Additionally, K.G. stated that she believed the incident was a mistake. The evidence therefore does not support an inference of guilt on the mens rea element. Thus, Goldesberry’s conviction does not rest on proof of every element beyond a reasonable doubt and must be reversed.
The conviction was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.