United States v. Jackson.
No. 25-1147. 9/14/2026. D.Colo. Judge Bacharach. Traffic Stop—Pat Down—Motion to Suppress—Reasonable Suspicion—Totality of the Circumstances—Unlawful Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
September 14, 2026
Officers Hurd and Moran observed a reverse-parked SUV in a parking lot around 2 a.m. The lot was in a high-crime area adjacent to a bus stop and a check-cashing store, but buses weren’t running at the time, and the store had been closed for hours. Suspecting drug dealing, the officers entered the lot and parked their patrol car, blocking the SUV. Three or four people were standing around the SUV and dispersed when the patrol car entered the lot. Jackson and two women were inside the SUV. The officers exited the police car and asked Jackson to get out of the SUV. Jackson complied, and the officers began a pat-down search. A struggle ensued that led the officers to find a gun in Jackson’s pants. Jackson was criminally charged and moved to suppress evidence about the gun, arguing that the officers detained him without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from the officers. Based on the testimony, the court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to make the stop and denied Jackson’s motion. Jackson was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition.
On appeal, Jackson argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He asserted that police lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so the stop was unlawful and the pat-down was tainted. He maintained that when considering whether the police had reasonable suspicion of a crime, the district court erroneously found that three or four people had stood outside the SUV and that Jackson had made furtive movements when the police car entered the lot. For the finding that three or four people had stood outside the SUV, the district court relied on both officers’ testimony. Jackson challenged the court’s reliance on Moran’s testimony, arguing that it conflicted with Hurd’s written accounts. However, the district court had discretion to assess Moran’s credibility against the written statements, and it acted within its discretion when crediting Moran’s testimony even though Hurd’s written statements didn’t mention the people outside the SUV. The court thus didn’t clearly err in finding that three or four people had stood around the SUV. Regarding Jackson’s furtive movements, he cited conflicting evidence and claimed that the officers didn’t see furtive movements until after they had blocked the SUV. However, regardless of whether Moran’s testimony at the suppression hearing conflicted with his written statement, the district court could resolve the inconsistency in assessing his credibility. Further, contrary to Jackson’s argument that police could not have observed furtive movements, the district court could reasonably infer that the officers would have viewed the SUV at an angle when entering the lot and, given the angle, could reasonably find that the SUV’s front seats and headrests wouldn’t have blocked the officers’ sight into the back seat. The district court thus didn’t err in crediting the officers’ testimony on Jackson’s furtive movements. Accordingly, the factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
As to the district court’s legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed, the totality of the circumstances—the reputation of the area as high-crime, the time of the incident, the reverse-parking of the SUV, the presence of people standing around the SUV and dispersing as the police approached, and Jackson’s furtive movements—supports the conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, the police didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment when stopping the SUV. And because the stop was permissible, the district court didn’t err in denying the motion to suppress.
The conviction was affirmed.