United States v. Little.
No. 23-5077. 10/11/2024. N.D.Okla. Judge Ebel. Indian Country—State Jurisdiction to Investigate—Fourth Amendment—Fifth Amendment—Eighth Amendment—Probable Cause—Sufficiency of Evidence—Jury Instructions—Government’s Statements During Closing Argument.
October 11, 2024
Oklahoma state police officers (the officers) investigated Little in April 2018 after his wife’s boyfriend Weatherford was shot and killed on the Muscogee Creek Reservation. The officers arrived at the crime scene and canvassed the surrounding area. After speaking to over 30 people, officers determined the time of the shooting. Officers also obtained surveillance footage showing Little’s truck parked in the vicinity of the crime moments before a gunshot could be heard on the footage, and showing Weatherford walking along train tracks near where Little had parked with a figure in dark clothing following him. Multiple people told police about prior incidents between Weatherford and Little. Officers also went to the home that Little shared with his mother, and Little’s mother consented to the officers’ seizure of Little’s rifle, which was found in the living room where Little slept. And officers found a lens cap to the scope of Little’s rifle in his truck bed. Little was taken to the police station, where he was read Miranda rights, signed a waiver, and was then interviewed. The next morning, officers interviewed Little again, advising him that his Miranda rights “still stood.” But they stopped the interview after Little expressed his desire to speak with an attorney. Little was indicted for first degree murder in Indian country. Little moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the state investigation on grounds that the state police lacked jurisdiction when they investigated the homicide, arrested and interrogated Little, and searched Little’s home. The district court denied the motion on the ground that the officers reasonably could have believed at the time of the investigation that Oklahoma had jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute this offense. Little was convicted as charged.
On appeal, Little argued that Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020), put the state officers on notice that they lacked jurisdiction to investigate the homicide in this case, which occurred on the Creek Reservation. Thus, the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. In Murphy, the Tenth Circuit held that Congress had not disestablished the Creek Reservation but stayed its mandate pending Supreme Court review. The same holding was reached by the Supreme Court two years later in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020). The context surrounding the decision to stay the mandate in Murphy could reasonably have been interpreted by Oklahoma law enforcement officers as indicating that they could continue investigating offenses on Creek land pending Supreme Court review, which they did. Accordingly, Oklahoma officers acted in good faith between Murphy in 2017 and McGirt in 2020. And Oklahoma state officers who investigated Little’s offense on the Creek Reservation in April 2018 could reasonably believe that they had jurisdiction to investigate and arrest Little. Under these unique circumstances, while it is undisputed that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over the offense here, the evidence obtained through the investigation was admissible in the subsequent federal prosecution of Little under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
On the merits, Little challenged the district court’s probable cause determination. Officers arrested Little only eight hours after the shooting, during which time they took statements from over 30 people and gathered other evidence that supported a “fair probability” that Little killed Weatherford. Therefore, the district court did not err in its probable cause determination.
Little also argued that his rifle should have been suppressed because the officers’ entry into his home violated the Fourth Amendment as his mother did not voluntarily consent to the entry. But Little forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below or argue plain error on appeal. Further, Little’s mother’s actions in leading the officers into the living room, which was also Little’s bedroom, demonstrated implied consent to the officers’ entry into the living room. And even if Little’s mother was emotionally distraught about the shooting and her son’s arrest, nothing in the record indicates that her emotions were so strong that they impaired her capacity to understand what the police were seeking and give her consent.
Little further contended that officers violated his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda by interviewing him a day after giving him Miranda warnings without repeating the warnings, by ignoring his invocation of his right to counsel during his second interview, and by coercing Little’s statements during his interviews. However, while some different officers interviewed Little the second day, the interview took place in the same room and discussed the same events. Therefore, the circumstances of the second interrogation did not change so seriously that Little’s statements were no longer voluntary or Little no longer understood and knowingly relinquished his rights, so officers did not need to re-Mirandize him for the statements to be admissible against him. Further, Little’s invocation of his right to counsel was ambiguous, and the circumstances of the interview show that Little’s statements during the interrogations were voluntary.
Little also raised several evidentiary challenges. However, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence; did not abuse its discretion in admitting Little’s rifle; did not plainly err in admitting the bullet recovered from Weatherford’s body; and did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements by Watkins.
Little also asserted that several of the district court’s jury instructions constitute reversible error. However, the district court did not violate Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 when it gave the jury copies of the jury instructions on the first day of trial, because the district court read the final instructions to the jury at the close of the case before the jury began deliberations. Second, the first degree murder instruction explained that, to find Little guilty, the jury needed to conclude that he “killed the victim with malice aforethought,” so a “mere presence” instruction was not necessary. And Little failed to establish that the reasonable doubt and credibility instructions were plainly erroneous.
The Tenth Circuit also determined that neither the district court’s denial of Little’s request to recross-examine Watkins nor the government’s statements during closing argument warrant reversal. Further, even when considered cumulatively, any district court errors do not warrant reversal, because Little failed to establish that cumulative error affected the jury’s decision in his case.
Little additionally challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. But the record shows that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Little committed first degree murder.
Lastly, Little argued that his mandatory life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because he was 24 at the time of the offense and neuroscience has demonstrated that the brain continues to develop until age 25 or 26. This challenge is foreclosed by United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 2017).
The conviction and sentence were affirmed.