United States v. Lynn.
No. 25-5027. 6/30/2026. N.D.Okla. Judge Kelly. Crimes in Indian Country—Tribal Membership—Business Records—Double Hearsay—Jury Instructions—Imperfect Self-Defense.
June 30, 2026
Lynn was staying at a homeless camp with three others, including his brother Jason. The group was using narcotics. During the night, Lynn went to a nearby encampment where Burke, Monroig, and Walthers were sleeping in tents. Jason had had a verbal confrontation with Burke about a month earlier when he went to her camp asking for drugs. Walthers asked who was outside, and Lynn claimed to be Jason. Lynn then said he wanted his stolen belongings back, and Walthers said they did not have his belongings and asked him to leave. Lynn continued asking for his belongings and said he had a gun. Burke then told Walthers to shine a flashlight on Lynn, which he did, and Lynn said he would leave if Walthers turned the flashlight off. When Walthers turned off the flashlight, Lynn fired multiple shots at the tents, injuring Burke and killing Monroig. Lynn ran back to his encampment and told Ervin and Jason that the people at the other encampment had shot at him first. Burke later identified Lynn as the shooter. Lynn was charged with various crimes in Indian country. At closing, defense counsel did not contest that Lynn was the shooter but contended he had acted in self-defense because Walthers had a gun and shot first, and that Lynn acted in imperfect self-defense because he heard shots in the area and mistakenly believed he was in danger. Lynn was convicted of multiple offenses in Indian country, including first degree murder (count 1); assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (count 2); carrying, using, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (count 3); and assault resulting in serious bodily injury (count 4). He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder count and 120 months each on the other counts, with counts 1, 2, and 4 to run concurrently and count 3 to run consecutively to the other counts, resulting in a sentence of life plus 10 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Lynn argued that the district court erred by admitting Exhibit 59, a screenshot from a tribal database showing his tribal membership and blood quantum. He maintained that Exhibit 59 was improper hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), so his Indian status was not proved and his convictions must be reversed. One way of proving a defendant’s Indian status is through a tribal document containing such information. Here, the government introduced Exhibit 59 through witness Tomlinson, who worked for the Choctaw Nation’s tribal enrollment department and supervised a team that processes Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood (CDIBs) and tribal memberships. Tomlinson had sufficient personal knowledge supporting the district court’s admission of Exhibit 59 under the business records exception, so the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Lynn also argued that Exhibit 59 violated the Confrontation Clause. He maintained that the CDIB information in Exhibit 59 was double hearsay because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), rather than the tribe, prepared it. However, information from an outsider that is included in a business record can come in under the business records exception if the business entity has adequate verification or other assurance of such information’s accuracy. Here, the tribe first reviews and processes CDIB applications before sending them to the BIA, the CDIB information comes directly from the BIA, and the tribe verifies blood quantum. Further, a CDIB is required for enrollment in the Choctaw Nation. Accordingly, the tribe has an interest in ensuring the accuracy and trustworthiness of that information, so the information regarding Lynn’s CDIB in Exhibit 59 was not double hearsay. Further, Tomlinson testified that the record was not prepared in anticipation of litigation, so it was not testimonial and its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Lynn further contended that the self-defense instruction was erroneous because it was not sufficiently tailored to his case. However, the court gave the jury a correct instruction on the law, so there was no abuse of discretion.
Lastly, Lynn asserted that the court erred by overruling defense counsel’s request to include imperfect self-defense as an essential element of the charged homicide offenses that the government must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt, so his first degree murder conviction must be reversed. Here, the instructions did not explicitly tell the jury that the government had to prove that the homicide was not done in imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. And the verdict form did not mention imperfect self-defense but instructed the jury to address the next lesser included homicide offense if it found Lynn not guilty of, or could not agree on, the greater-included offenses. The district court thus erred, and the error was not harmless because the district court had concluded that there was sufficient evidence to warrant giving an imperfect self-defense instruction.
The district court’s decision to admit Exhibit 59 and its overruling Lynn’s objection to the perfect self-defense instruction were affirmed, and Lynn’s convictions on counts 2, 3, and 4 were affirmed. The case was remanded with instructions to vacate Lynn’s conviction on count 1 only and to conduct further proceedings.