United States v. Milliron.

No. 23-1217. 6/23/2026. D.Colo. Judge Phillips. Grand Jury Testimony—Perjury—Accessory After the Fact—Obstruction of Justice—Sufficiency of Evidence—Materiality—Double Jeopardy.

June 23, 2026

Rudolph, a dentist, began an extramarital affair with his hygienist, Milliron, that lasted for several years. During this time, Rudolph helped Milliron pay for her house, car, and vacations and funded Milliron’s children’s housing, educations, and plastic surgeries. In spring 2016, Rudolph’s wife, Bianca, learned of the affair and demanded that he end it. But he kept seeing Milliron, and in the fall of 2016, he murdered Bianca while on safari in Zambia. To conceal the murder, Rudolph staged a scene so it looked like Bianca had accidentally shot herself in the heart. Zambian authorities investigated but found no wrongdoing. Rudolph had Bianca’s body cremated in Zambia. He subsequently collected just under $5 million in life-insurance proceeds for Bianca’s death. Within six months of the murder, Milliron moved in with Rudolph, who used over a million dollars from Bianca’s life insurance proceeds to construct a $2.5 million house for him and Milliron. By 2020, Milliron knew that Rudolph killed Bianca, because several patrons at a restaurant where the couple was dining overheard Rudolph tell Bianca that he killed his wife for her.

Meanwhile, the FBI was investigating Rudolph for foreign murder. Rudolph found out about the investigation through his son, whom FBI agents had approached to talk about the investigation. The government filed a criminal complaint against Rudolph, charging foreign murder and mail fraud related to Bianca’s life insurance proceeds. In August 2020, Milliron appeared via subpoena before the grand jury that was investigating Rudolph and testified about, among other things, her relationship with Rudolph and comments he had made to her about the FBI’s investigation. The grand jury indicted Rudolph. A month later, it indicted Milliron on five counts of perjury, one count of accessory after the fact to foreign murder, and one count of obstruction of justice, each charge stemming from Milliron’s grand jury testimony. Rudolph and Milliron were tried jointly. A jury convicted Milliron on two of the five perjury counts (counts 6 and 9), the accessory count, and the obstruction count. Milliron moved for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied her motion. Milliron was sentenced to 204 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the sentencing guidelines.

On appeal, Milliron argued as to count 6 that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that her statements were knowingly false. To obtain a perjury conviction against Milliron, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) she made a statement under oath before a grand jury, (2) the statement was false, (3) she knew the statement was false, and (4) the statement was material to the grand jury proceeding. And a witness generally can’t be convicted of perjury for truthfully responding that they did not know the reasoning underlying another person’s behavior. Milliron conceded that she testified under oath before a grand jury. Here, as to count 6, Milliron was asked to speculate about Rudolph’s motives, and she answered, “I don’t know.” And in another question, she was asked to more precisely speculate, and she again said she didn’t know. Given the prosecutor’s imprecise questions, there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Milliron’s statements in count 6 were knowingly false, so her conviction on this count must be reversed.

Milliron similarly argued that there was insufficient evidence that count 9’s statements were knowingly false or material to the grand jury’s proceedings. Here, the prosecutor’s question focused on a specific conversation Rudolph and Milliron had months after he told her that he had killed his wife. The prosecutor asked if Rudolph proclaimed his innocence during that conversation. Milliron answered, “He probably did. I don’t really recall that.” Milliron’s argument doesn’t address the “I don’t really recall that” statement, so the Tenth Circuit considered only the “He probably did” answer. For a reasonable jury to find Milliron’s statement “He probably did” to be knowingly false, the government had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Milliron knew that Rudolph didn’t proclaim his innocence to her in that conversation. Given the circumstances of Rudolph’s and Milliron’s relationship, including their longtime affair and cohabitation, the jury could infer that Milliron knew that Rudolph planned to kill Bianca long before her grand jury testimony. Second, before their conversation, Rudolph had told Milliron in public that he was guilty. A reasonable jury could thus find Milliron’s statement “He probably did” to be both knowingly false and material.

Milliron further contended that her testimony was immaterial to the grand jury’s decision to indict Rudolph because (1) guilty people regularly proclaim their innocence, and (2) the grand jury had other evidence to indict him. A false statement is material if it could have influenced the grand jury’s decisions. First, the grand jury knew that Milliron was Rudolph’s intimate confidante, so Rudolph’s proclaiming his innocence to Milliron might have had more weight with the grand jury than his proclaiming it to a wide audience. The Tenth Circuit rejected the second argument because it need not weigh a statement’s materiality relative to other evidence presented. Because the jury had sufficient evidence to find that one of Milliron’s statements in count 9 was knowingly false and material, her perjury conviction on that count was affirmed.

Milliron also asserted that her accessory-after-the-fact conviction fails because that crime cannot rest on perjury alone. First, she argues that, based on the plain language of the accessory statute, 18 USC § 3, Congress intended accessory liability to require more than just perjury. Second, she argues that, because accessory after the fact’s maximum sentence is 15 years and perjury’s is only five, Congress didn’t want accessory and perjury convictions for the same conduct. The Tenth Circuit rejected the first argument because it is unsupported by relevant case law and the second argument because it wasn’t developed. Milliron’s conduct fell within the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of 18 USC § 3, so her conviction under that statute was affirmed.

Milliron also challenged her obstruction conviction on double jeopardy grounds, asserting that obstruction of justice is a lesser included offense of perjury, so she cannot be sentenced for both. However, unlike obstruction of justice, perjury doesn’t require an intent to obstruct a proceeding. Because obstruction requires proof of a fact that perjury does not, obstruction is not a lesser-included offense of perjury.

The jury’s verdict was affirmed except for Milliron’s conviction on count 6, which was vacated. The case was remanded for further proceedings.