Verheggen v. Adams County Department of Human Services.
Colorado Equal Pay for Equal Work Act—Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act—Discriminatory or Unfair Employment Practices—Wages—Causal Link Between Protected Activity and Employer Action.
July 23, 2026
Verheggen was employed by the Adams County Department of Human Services (ACDHS), where she worked for several years as a caseworker. She was then promoted to an intake supervisor position, which required her to work 76 hours every eight days. But Verheggen was only paid for 40 hours of work per week, and she asked her manager and a human resources representative why she was required to work extended hours without additional pay. Verheggen was told this was part of her job duties. For several years, Verheggen’s schedule went back and forth from working 40 hours per week to the 76-hour-per-eight-days schedule. Verheggen’s schedule eventually returned to 40 hours per week, but in 2022, Verheggen, through her attorney, sent a wage demand letter to the ACDHS, care of McDougal, in her capacity as the ACDHS director. The demand letter requested $745,461.39 in back pay. Verheggen didn’t receive any of the requested pay, and in 2023, she filed her first complaint in this case, naming the Adams County Board of Commissioners (the board) as the only defendant. About two months later, Verheggen received a reprimand and suspension. The ACDHS later rescinded the suspension but only after it had escorted her from the office, prevented her from working, and withheld her pay. Verheggen later filed two amended complaints, with the operative complaint naming the ACDHS, McDougal, Daggett (the deputy director of the ACDHS), and Burbidge (Verheggen’s supervisor) as defendants (but not the board). The operative complaint alleged that defendants violated the Colorado Equal Pay for Equal Work Act (EPEWA) and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) by suspending her in retaliation for sending the demand letter and filing the initial complaint. (Verheggen asserted the EPEWA claim against all defendants but asserted the CADA claim only against the ACDHS.) Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Verheggen failed to state claims under the EPEWA and CADA. The district court interpreted the EPEWA and CADA to apply only to complaints containing allegations related to gender discrimination, and because Verheggen didn’t allege that she suffered gender discrimination or an adverse employment action in retaliation for raising concerns about gender-based pay disparities, the district court dismissed her claims under CRCP 12(b)(5).
On appeal, Verheggen contended that the district court erred by construing EPEWA and CADA to require allegations related to gender discrimination when bringing a claim for retaliation. The court of appeals concluded that an employee is not required to make allegations relating to gender discrimination to state a claim for relief under either EPEWA or CADA, which both prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for discussing or disclosing the employee’s wages. Thus, the district court erred by dismissing Verheggen’s EPEWA and CADA claims.
Defendants argued that Verheggen failed to state a claim against some or all of the defendants even if the EPEWA and CADA contemplate a retaliation claim in the absence of gender discrimination. Daggett and Burbidge aren’t “employers” within the meaning of the EPEWA, so the district court did not err by dismissing the EPEWA claim as to Daggett and Burbidge.
Defendants also asserted that Verheggen didn’t plausibly allege a causal link between any protected activity and the suspension because (1) any protected activity was temporally distant from the suspension, and (2) the activities closer in time to the suspension (the demand letter and complaint) weren’t protected activity. The court rejected the assertion that the demand letter (and the earlier protected activity) is too remote in time to the suspension for the court to infer a causal link, as the claims allege an escalating pattern of Verheggen trying to address her dissatisfaction with her wages. And the demand letter discusses her wages, so it qualifies as a protected activity. The court did not decide whether the complaint is protected activity because even if it isn’t, Verheggen plausibly alleged a link between other protected activity and the suspension.
The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.