Works v. Byers.
No. 22-7054. 2/14/2025. E.D.Okla. Judge Carson. Sexual Conduct Involving Inmates—Eighth Amendment—Qualified Immunity—Jurisdiction to Review Factual Record De Novo.
February 14, 2025
Works was formerly incarcerated in the Pushmataha County jail. She was an inmate designated by the sheriff to perform work duties within the jail, known as a “trustee.” Byers was a detention officer during Works’s incarceration. One night, Byers went to Works’s cell and told Works to retrieve jumpsuits from the laundry room, even though Works was not the designated laundry trustee. Works and Byers entered the laundry room, and Byer told Works to drop her pants. Works resisted, but then complied. Byers then inserted a finger or penis inside Works’s vagina. Works did not call for help during the incident, but a security camera recorded it on video. Works brought a 42 USC § 1983 action against Byers, alleging that Byers violated her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Byers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion.
As an initial matter on appeal, Byers argued for the Tenth Circuit to review the factual record de novo, asserting that the district court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on him when determining whether Works consented to the sexual act. Works contended that the district court did not err and argued that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the district court’s factual findings. The Tenth Circuit has held that consensual sexual conduct between a guard and a prisoner does not rise to a constitutional violation. Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2013). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a constitutional violation. In sexual abuse cases, this means the plaintiff must show a lack of consent to the sexual conduct to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Here, instead of requiring Works to show that a reasonable jury could find she did not consent to the sexual act, the district court placed the burden on Byers to show “overwhelming evidence of consent” and suggested that it must find a lack of consent “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court thus improperly shifted the burden to Byers and erred. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction to review the factual record de novo.
On the merits, once Byers asserted qualified immunity, Works had to show that (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting that Byers violated her constitutional right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation. To satisfy her burden under the first prong, Works was required to establish a constitutional violation based on facts a reasonable jury could accept as true. Sexual assault of an inmate is analyzed as an excessive force claim, requiring the inmate to show (1) objectively harmful conduct to establish a constitutional violation and (2) that the guard acted with a sufficiently culpable mental state. As to the objective harm requirement, the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that a correctional officer’s nonconsensual sexual abuse of a prisoner is objectively harmful enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Byers did not contest that a sexual act occurred with Works, so the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether there was a lack of consent. Here, Works rejected Byers’s advances and said she didn’t want to “do this.” She also told her cellmate that what just happened “wasn’t cool.” And Works presented evidence of coercion, which supports a lack of consent. Additionally, Byers invoked his Fifth Amendment right when asked questions about evidence of Works’s lack of consent, so the Tenth Circuit applied an adverse inference against him. A reasonable jury could thus accept as true that Byers used nonconsensual force to invade Works’s bodily integrity, so Works met her burden in showing that Byers’s conduct was objectively harmful. As to Byers’s mental state, inserting a finger or penis into an inmate’s vagina has no legitimate penological purpose, so Works also showed that Byers had a sufficiently culpable mental state to indicate that he used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Works thus overcame the first prong of qualified immunity.
Byers also argued that the district court erred in finding that the law was clearly established at the time of the incident. However, when the sexual act occurred, the law was clearly established that a guard’s nonconsensual sexual assault of an inmate, which includes inserting a finger or penis into an inmate’s vagina, violates the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Therefore, Byers violated Works’s clearly established constitutional right, and Works overcame the second prong of qualified immunity.
The denial of the motion for qualified immunity was affirmed.