Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections.
No. 25-1068. 5/11/2026. D.Colo. Judge Bacharach. Employment Training—Hostile Work Environment—Dismissal With Prejudice.
May 11, 2026
Young is a white man who worked for the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC). While employed at CDOC, Young had to attend a racial sensitivity training program. Young believed that the training program was extreme, and he sued the CDOC for a hostile work environment based on race and claimed constructive discharge. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a valid claim. Young appealed, and the Tenth Circuit held that the single incident of training was insufficient to allege a hostile work environment; and the allegations about employment opportunities, workplace cohesion, and security risks were speculative. Young v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 94 F.4th 1242, 1245, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 2024). Young then added allegations about the aftermath of the training program, claiming that the CDOC had an ongoing commitment for this type of training; employees had to endorse the training’s race-based ideology; supervisors used the training for disciplinary decisions; the training compromised security; and CDOC failed to investigate his allegations. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a valid claim.
On appeal, Young argued that the training program created generalizations about the role of all white people in perpetuating mistreatment of racial minorities. The Tenth Circuit considered whether the combination of old and new allegations indicated discrimination so severe or pervasive as to render the workplace overtly hostile. The previous allegations pointed to a glossary used in the training, alleged advice given during the training to leaders to treat employees differently based on race, and the training’s inclusion of recommendations of videos about discriminatory housing and intersectionality that had generalized discussion about white people’s attitudes toward race. Given the similarity between Young’s allegations about the glossary and videos in his prior appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded again that the glossary and videos didn’t render the workplace permeated with abuse. As to the alleged advice given to leaders, Young didn’t explain how it rendered the workplace permeated with abuse.
Regarding the new allegations, Young contended that the CDOC committed to this kind of training and it would continue with the same racist approach. But Young experienced only one training session and quit four months later. His fears that future programming would treat white people in a negative light were speculative. As to Young’s argument that employees had to endorse the training’s race-based ideology, the training included admonitions that employees were not required to change their values or beliefs and should discuss questions and challenges from the training, so Young’s allegations did not plausibly allege a pattern of abuse against white employees who disagreed with the training. Regarding his argument that supervisors were already acting upon the training in making disciplinary decisions, Young cited only one unexplained reversal of discipline against another officer, which wouldn’t render Young’s job permeated with abuse. As to Young’s contention that the training compromised security because white guards might loosen restrictions to avoid accusations of racism, the Tenth Circuit found that these allegations were speculative in the prior appeal. And in this appeal, Young’s allegations didn’t refer to particular instances or suggest that the changes jeopardized security. Lastly, Young didn’t explain how the CDOC’s failure to investigate his allegations would have affected his work environment. Young’s additional five allegations thus didn’t meet the extremely high threshold to create a workplace that is pervasively discriminatory.
Young also asserted that the abusive work environment forced him to quit. Because he didn’t plausibly allege a hostile work environment, the claim of a constructive discharge failed, and the court didn’t err in dismissing this claim.
Lastly, Young argued that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. Here, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice after Young had filed four versions of the complaint in two separate actions. And he didn’t state how he could avoid the shortcomings in his fourth version of the complaint. The district court thus didn’t abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
The judgment was affirmed.